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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
TODD DAVID WILLARD, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 890666-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a prosecution 
involving two second degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear this case under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989) 
and Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure [Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(3)(a) (Supp. 1989), repealed effective July 1, 
1990.]. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court properly suppress the evidence 
discovered during a warrantless search of respondent's vehicle? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
2 
2. United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
3. Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15, (1982): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant was brought before the Honorable John V. Tibbs, 
District Court Judge, on charges of two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (amended 1989). Defendant moved 
to suppress the evidence prior to trial and this motion was denied 
by Judge Tibbs. Defendant renewed his motion at a bench trial on 
May 31, 1989, and at this trial, after all the evidence had been 
presented, Judge Tibbs granted defendants motion to suppress this 
evidence. The prosecution was dismissed, and the State appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 10, 1988, the Sevier County Sheriff's Office 
set up a road block at which defendant Willard was stopped (T-3. 
17). The main purpose of this road block was a driver's license 
and registration check (T-3. 23). Defendant was asked by Deputy 
Sandy 0. Roberts to produce his driver's license and vehicle 
registration and defendant complied with the request (T-3. 17). 
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While Deputy Roberts was observing the information defendant 
provided, Deputy Barney of the Sevier County Sheriff's Office told 
Deputy Roberts to go ask the defendant for permission to search the 
vehicle (T-3. 18-19). 
The officers felt that defendant seemed nervous and 
agitated; there were eight policemen at the scene of the road block 
(T-l. 18,23,32). The drivers license and registration were 
verified, and then Deputy Roberts walked back to defendant's 
vehicle and allegedly asked if defendant would mind if his vehicle 
was "looked through" (T-3. 25,27). Defendant testified that the 
officers did not ask him for permission to search his vehicle (T-
3. 56,57). Deputy Roberts couldn't recall defendant's exact words 
but stated that defendant said something to the effect of "It's all 
right with me" (T-3. 25). Defendant stated he made no such reply 
(T-3. 56-57). 
It was not explained to the defendant what he was 
consenting to; the deputies presumed that defendant would know what 
was meant when asked if they could look though his vehicle (T-3. 
28). Defendant was then asked by Deputy Barney to unlock the back 
of his vehicle (T-3. 34). Defendant was asked if any weapons were 
within the vehicle and he replied "yes" and proceeded to retrieve 
them for the deputy (T-3. 34). The deputy took the weapons 
immediately from the defendant and asked him to stand aside while 
the search continued (T-3. 35). 
Defendant attempted to go to the back of his vehicle and 
was stopped by other officers at the scene (T-3. 35). Deputy 
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Barney went to the back of vehicle and saw a black backpack and 
examined the contents of the bag (T-3. 35). He observed what 
appeared to be marijuana and a white substance. 
Judge Tibbs found that once the defendant furnished the 
drivers license and the registration, that the purpose of the road 
block came to a close and that there was no need for the subsequent 
search (T-3. 74). He felt that the issue of consent was moot at 
that point (T-3. 74). The evidence obtained in this search of 
defendant vehicle was suppressed under the federal and state 
constitutions (T-3. 75) and the case was dismissed. [Judge Tibbs 
made the finding that defendant specifically granted consent by 
saying, "It's all right with mew so that these findings could be 
"taken up" (T-3. 76).] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly suppressed the evidence obtained 
in the search of defendant's vehicle under the state and federal 
constitutions. The court correctly found that the detention of the 
defendant was unconstitutional under state and federal 
constitutions. The defendant was improperly detained after his 
license and registration had been checked and found to have been 
proper, thus satisfying the purpose of the road block. Even if the 
detention was not found to be unconstitutional, the subsequent 
warrantless search of defendant's vehicle was not consented to by 
the defendant. Defendant did not give a knowing, intelligent and 
unequivocable waiver of his right to be free from unlawful search 
and seizures. Any consent, if given, was the product of fear and 
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coercion. This supports the finding that the evidence obtained in 
this illegal search should be suppressed and the case be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEPUTIES LACKED THE NECESSARY REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO SEARCH DEPENDANT'S VEHICLE WITHOUT 
A WARRANT OR CONSENT. 
The search of defendant's vehicle was not based on the 
necessary reasonable suspicion to proceed without a warrant, nor 
was consent obtained. Once the purpose of the road block was 
satisfied, the defendant should have been free to go. The search 
of the defendant's automobile has violated the defendant's immunity 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, any and all 
evidence obtained in the course of this search should be 
suppressed. 
Defendant Willard was initially stopped at the road block 
for no other purpose than to check his license and registration. 
Once the license and registration were verified there was no reason 
to detain him further. Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1982) provides 
that "a police officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in 
the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense 
and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions." (Id.) See also, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); 
State v. Menke, 787 P. 2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Even so, the 
deputies lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion to have detained 
the defendant and searched his automobile. 
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This reasonable suspicion must be based on objective 
facts that the individual is involved in criminal activity. State 
v, Carpena, 714 P. 2d 674 (Utah 1986)• Nervous behavior of an 
occupant of a vehicle and lack of eye contact are not facts which 
support a reasonable suspicion that a defendant is engaged in 
illegal activity. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988). 
The deputies testified that defendant Willard appeared nervous, 
wiredr and frightened. Indeed, this is what they based their 
"hunch" on, and these facts alone do not support a reasonable 
suspicion. A seizure of evidence may ordinarily only be justified 
if incident to a stop for a traffic offense or based at least upon 
a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants of the 
vehicle had or were going to commit a crime. State v. Talbot, 134 
U.Adv. 15 (Utah App. 1990), and since this stop was not a traffic 
violation and was not based on reasonable suspicion, the evidence 
was properly suppressed and the charges dismissed against the 
defendant. 
POINT II 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANTS VEHICLE WAS 
WARRANTLESS AND NON-CONSENSUAL WHICH VIOLATES 
U.S. AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
A search and seizure may be made without a warrant if the 
individual gives his consent thereto. McDonald v. United States, 
307 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1962). Defendant did not voluntarily 
consent to the search of his vehicle. For consent to considered 
voluntary, it must clearly appear that the consent to search was 
intelligently and understandingly given. 
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Defendant Willard did not specifically say to the deputy 
that it was permissible for the deputies to look through his car. 
He testified that he had no idea that his car was going to be 
searched in the manner that it was. The deputy to whom he 
supposedly consented can't even recall his exact words, if any were 
spoken. Deputy Roberts testified that she just presumed that 
defendant Willard understood what the search of his automobile 
would entail (T-3. 28). Where the authorities have acted without 
a warrant, the legality of this action is not to be presumed. Id. 
at 417. The prosecution failed to meet their burden of proving 
that the consent was unequivocably waived in relying on a 
presumption that consent was given. 
In addition to the requirement that consent must be 
knowing and intelligent, there must be no duress or coercion 
involved. Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965). 
The consent must not be the result of duress or coercion, express 
or implied. State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) 
(emphasis added). If defendant Willard had indeed said, "It's all 
right," this was not a voluntary statement. Deputy Roberts 
testified at trial that there were eight deputies surrounding the 
defendant and his car. No one explained anything to him concerning 
the search. Defendant was not free to come and go as he pleased. 
Although he was not handcuffed, he was accompanied by two other 
deputies while the search ensued. Any attempt to stop the search 
would surely have been halted, as evidenced by restraint of the 
defendant when he grabbed at his backpack. Defendant had no other 
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alternative than to sit back and watch the officers rummage through 
his personal belongings. This would surely frighten an individual 
into consent whether or not he was engaging in illegal activities. 
Consent was not given to the deputy to search his 
vehicle, and even if it is found that the defendant did state, 
"It's all right ...", the consent was coerced by frightening the 
defendant into consenting, and the motion to suppress the evidence 
was properly granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Willard did not voluntarily consent to the 
search of his vehicle. For consent to be voluntary, it must be 
knowing, intelligent, not coerced. Whether or not the coercion was 
the result of a constitutional or unconstitutional detention is not 
the issue, the issue is simply whether or not there was coercion. 
The circumstances of the search were such that defendant had no 
other alternative but to consent. His consent was involuntary and 
the search was in violation of the Uniteck States and State 
Constitution. Defendant Willardfs motion bo suppress was properly 
granted. 
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